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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBIN L. HOUGH,
Plaintiff and Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Case No. 880123-CA

vs.
JOEL E. COLLEY,
Defendant and Appellant
and Cross-Respondent.

Before Judges Bench/ Garff and Orme.

* * * * * * * *

Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals, Joel E. Colley petitions the Court for a
rehearing on the issues set forth hereafter.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REHEARING

ISSUE

1;

There is no evidence to support the

trial court's finding number 6 that "it was understood and
agreed that the plaintiff would devote all her time and
talents to the property and defendant would contribute
money, but that both would share on an equal basis", and

ISSUE

2: A distribution to Miss Hough, other than

profits from the partnership, based upon her rendition only
of services, is contrary to the facts of the case and
contrary to the law.
I
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT MISS HOUGH'S OBLIGATION WAS LIMITED
TO "TIME AND TALENTS" BUT THAT DR. COLLEY HAD
THE ENTIRE FINANCIAL BURDEN
Defendant does still not know when or where the
partnership between himself and Miss Hough arouse; the
opinion of this court provides no guidance on that matter.
Nevertheless, this court having determined that there is
sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision
that a partnership in fact existed, defendant does not contest that determination further.

Critical, however, to the

trial court's scheme of distribution, which this court
affirmed, was its finding number 6 that Miss Hough's obligation to the partnership was only to provide services but
that Dr. Colley had the entire financial burden.

This is

not an issue upon which there is disputed evidence; rather,
there is no evidence in the record to support this critical
finding by the trial court.

This court erred, therefore, in

concluding that there was "substantial competent evidence"
to support that finding.

In deed, neither this court, nor

Miss Hough's counsel have been able to cite to any evidence
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in the record that supports that finding by Judge Conder.
In her brief, Miss Hough merely restated the trial court's
finding and then argued that since the court had made that
finding there must have been evidence to support it; however, Miss Hough provided no reference to any specific
facts, nor any citation to the record, that would support
that finding*

This court, similarly, appeared to gloss over

that pivitol finding and apparently concluded that since
there was evidence to support the trial court's finding of a
partnership the other related finding must also be correct.
Defendant submits, however, that such is not the case. The
notion that Miss Hough had no financial obligation to the
partnership was erroneously created by the trial court without any support in the evidence or record of this case. Dr.
Colley admits that the trial court did, in fact, make its
finding number 6 but that finding is totally unsupportable
by the record.

Dr. Colley requests, therefore, that this

court rehear that matter.
A.

The plaintiff herself did not contend that her

obligation to the partnership was limited to time and talent
only.

Even Miss Hough herself, did not contend that her

obligation to the partnership was limited to her time and
talents only.

She testified that her obligation included a

financial commitment.

Referring to the time the parties

were in Texas, plaintiff testified:
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"We both contributed everything. We
contributed all of our finances/ we contributed all of our time, all of our talent, all
of our efforts." R. Vol. I. p. 41 (emphasis
added).
Plaintiff testified that their relationship in Pennsylvania
also included a financial commitment.

Miss Hough stated:

"It was our understanding, that all of
our efforts, our financial efforts, our
physical efforts, our intellectual efforts
were to be combined so that we — our unit
could grow." T. Vol. I, p. 55 (emphasis
added).
Regarding their association in Utah, Miss Hough testified:
"We committed 100% of everything, our
finances, our mental, physical, emotional efforts up to the time that we separated. We
still had a tremendous amount of contact after
that up until November, 1982 and still a lot
of financial involvement, talking, but the
combination was not what it had been prior to
our separation. Prior to our separation it
was 100%. T. Vol. I. p. 175-176 (emphasis
added).
Plaintiff also stated that:
"We combined
accounts, and
energies into
144 (emphasis

all of our income into our
all of our efforts, all of our
a common pool." T. Vol. I. p.
added).

Plaintiff freely admitted that her agreement with Dr. Colley
required her to contribute not only her time and talents but
also all of her finances to their association.

Plaintiff's

own testimony is clearly contrary to the trial court's
finding number 6.
B.

Miss Hough's obligation did not change.

There

can be no contention that Miss Hough's obligation to contri-4-

(

bute money to the partnership ever changed.

When asked,

"Did the agreement ever change so far as you understood it?"
Miss Hough responded, "Never."

T. Vol. I. p. 44. According

to plaintiff, she had an obligation to contribute not only
her time, efforts, and talents, but also her money to the
association.

Also, according to plaintiff, that obligation

never changed; therefore, the court's finding number 6 that
plaintiff's obligation somehow did change and that defendant
somehow became solely obligated to put up all of the money
while plaintiff was relieved from her obligation to contribute her finances but only had to provide "time and talent",
is clearly contrary to the testimony of both of the parties
in this matter and is, contrary to this court's conclusion,
totally unsupported by the evidence.
C.

Miss Hough breached the terms of the agreement.

The parties ceased residing together on October 30, 1981.
Thereafter, the record is undisputed that Miss Hough completely abandoned her commitment to Dr. Colley and to the
properties.

After the parties separated Dr. Colley advanced

ONE HUNDRED FORTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
DOLLARS ($146,247), for the purpose of preserving the property.

T. Vol. II. p. 172-173, (Ex. 110). During that time

Dr. Colley also performed all of the management duties for
the properties; plaintiff performed none.

After October 30,

1981, Miss Hough paid only FORTY TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS
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($4,200) for property maintenance,

T, Vol. II. p. 173, The

fact that Miss Hough paid even that miserly amount shows,
nevertheless, that she recognized a financial obligation to
Dr, Colley and to the properties.

During that same period

of time Miss Hough devoted none of her time or talents to
the properties; rather, she used them, and her money, to
acquire assets in her own name.
Appellant's Brief.

See pp. 24-28 of

The trial court held that the partner-

ship was actually terminated upon trial of the case
(February, 1985) some 3-1/2 years after the parties separated.

It is undisputed that Dr. Colley continued to utilize

his funds for the maintenance and preservation of the property while at the same time, Miss Hough turned her back on
the properties and directed her efforts toward her own personal gain.

It seems clear, therefore, that even the most

generous reading of the trial court's findings shows that
Miss Hough violated the terms of the agreement she had with
Dr. Colley and that for 3-1/2 years she did not even devote
her time or talents to the partnership.
II
A DISTRIBUTION OF A PORTION OF THE CAPITAL
ASSETS OF THE PARTNERSHIP BASED UPON PLAINTIFF'S
TIME, TALENT AND SERVICES IS ERROR
If Miss Hough is entitled to a distribution from
the partnership, she is entitled to a share of the profits
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only after Dr. Colley's capital contributions have been returned to him.

It has been stated:

Where one partner has contributed
capital and the other services, the one contributing the capital is entitled to withdraw
its value. 1 S. Rowley on Partnerships (2d
ed. 1960) p. 453.
Under some circumstances personal services may constitute a
capital contribution to a partnership; however, there must
be a specific agreement to that effect; otherwise, a partner
who contributes services is not entitled to share in the
capital upon dissolution.
281 (Alaska 1983).

Schymanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d

There is no evidence of the required

specific agreement in this case. As has been noted elsewhere:
A partner contributing only services and
no capital, is ordinarily entitled to no share
of capital on dissolution, the capital is returned to the partner supplying it. Tiffany
v. Short, 22 Cal. 2d 531, 139 P.2d 939 (1943).
The partner contributing only services is limited to his
share of the profits of the enterprise as compensation for
his services.

Hunter v. Allen, 174 Or. 261, 147 P.2d 213,

modified on other grounds, 148 P.2d 936, (1944).
Generally where one partner contributes the capital
of the firm while another contributes skill and labor, the
partner who made the capital contribution is entitled, on
dissolution, to repayment of such capital before any distribution of profits is made.

A partner who furnishes no
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capital/ but contributes merely time, skill and services, is
not entitled on dissolution to any part of the original firm
capital, but must look for compensation for such time and
services to a share of the profits.

Vassallo v. Sexauer, 22

Mich. App. 188, 177 N.W.2d 470 (1970); Bass v. Daetwyler,
305 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1957); Baum v. McBride, 152 Neb. 152, 40
N.W.2d 649 (1950).
In the instant case, the trial court failed to
require an accounting between the parties and also failed to
determine whether or not there were any profits to distribute.

The trial court's distribution scheme was, apparent-

ly, based upon its finding number 6 that plaintiff's obligation was limited merely to time and services.

In any event,

the trial court failed to properly apply the law since Miss
Hough's distribution from the partnership, based upon time
and services, should have been limited to profits from the
partnership only and not to capital contributions.

If find-

ing number 6 is upheld, Miss Hough would only be entitled to
a share of the profits.

If Miss Hough's obligation to con-

tribute financially to the partnership is recognized then
there cannot be a distribution without a proper accounting.
As it now stands, however, Miss Hough has received the best
of both worlds; a portion of the partnership's capital without an obligation to contribute to that capital.

Defendant

submits that this is error and is contrary to the evidence
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of this case and that this court erred in sustaining the
trial court on that issue.

CONCLUSION
This court erred in determining that the trial
courtfs finding number 6, that plaintiff would devote all
her time and talents to the property and defendant would
contribute money but that both would share on an equal
basis, is supported by competent evidence in the record.
Similarly, the distribution scheme that allowed Miss Hough
to receive not only one-half of the profits, but also onehalf of all of the capital contributed, is contrary to
partnership law.

Defendant requests, therefore, a rehearing

based upon the issues presented in this petition.
DATED this

^? T^aay of July, 1988.

---LJm
J. THOMAS BOWEN'

JU&^

Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant and Cross-Respondent

I certify that the foregoing Petition is presented in
good faith and not for delay.

J. THOMAS BOWEN
19.4
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